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INTRODUCTION
The Internet has matured into an unprecedented repository of data,
retrievable through myriad unique “links,” or Uniform Resource Loca-
tors. Yet, this wealth of information only became broadly accessible
through the invention and continual development of algorithm-based
* The author worked in the legal departments of Google Inc. and its German
subsidiary. Google provided no funding for this Article, which was written after the
employment relationship ended. The views expressed in this article are strictly those of the
author.
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search engines.1 Keyword searches empowered search-engine users to
find—and sometimes stumble upon—information with great ease. Indeed,
search-engine indices arguably have become the most comprehensive cata-
logues of information the world has ever seen.
This wealth of accessible information poses challenges to traditional
notions of privacy: aspects of our private and public lives, which previously
would have rarely left the vicinities of our immediate social or professional
circles, today find their way onto the Internet, where they are indexed for
effortless potential retrieval through search engines. Because the marginal
cost of indexing results for one more set of keywords (for instance, a per-
son’s name) is negligible compared to the economic reward for the largest
search engines, we find matching information when searching for people’s
names irrespective of the role they assume in public life.2 While this public
exposure may be immensely useful for some, problems arise when—for a
variety of reasons, ranging from the tragic to the banal—people object to
the dissemination of their personal information.3 Should there be new le-
gal protections to accommodate those affected by evolving technological
realities, or should we sacrifice privacy at the altar of freedom of expres-
sion and access to information?4 And if new legal protections are the an-
swer, who should be liable to provide relief?
In this debate, search engines have been framed as mere in-
termediaries, such as a newsstand or a card catalogue.5 This analogy, how-
ever, might be inaccurate today—unless we are to add that, inter alia, this
newsstand is frequented by about ninety percent of the market,6 and that
there is a list of publications about every person (or most people) available
at each of its locations. Moreover, search engines are the centralized, ha-
bitual gateways to the information consumed in today’s information socie-
ties, and thus, should not be excluded from attempts to address the
problems posed (in part) by the reality they helped create.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“the Court” or “the
CJEU”) confronted these questions in its May 2014 judgment in Google
Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario
1. See generally Elizabeth van Couvering, The History of the Internet Search Engine:
Navigational Media and the Traffic Commodity, in WEB SEARCH: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PER-
SPECTIVES, 177, 177-206 (Amanda Spink & Michael Zimmer eds., 2008).
2. See generally, Hal A. Varian, The Economics of Internet Search, 96 RIVISTA DI
POLITICA ECONOMICA 177, 177-191 (2006) (explaining the economics of low marginal costs as
applied to search engines).
3. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion: In Europe, the Right to Be Forgotten
Trumps the Internet, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion. See generally Brendan Nyhan, Why Rumors Outrace the
Truth Online, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/upshot/its-so-
much-more-fun-to-spread-rumors-than-the-truth.?_r=0 (discussing how public exposure on-
line may lead to misconceptions and rumors that are difficult).
4. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
5. See Toobin, supra note 3.
6. Id.
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Costeja González. 7 Based on the premise that new technologies require
concomitant, evolving rights,8 the Court’s solution was a “right to be for-
gotten,” that is, a right to have search-engine results removed from search
indices. While hailed as a victory by some, others have criticized the prior-
ity placed on the right to be forgotten over other, equally relevant rights.9
It is all too easy to settle for a reductionist explanation that the judg-
ment’s merits are relative depending on one’s cultural perspective or the
interest represented.10 Rather, this Article seeks to contribute a critical
examination of the legal-political context of the judgment within the Euro-
pean Union, the soundness of the Court’s reasoning, the Court’s likely
animating principles, and its actual or probable effects. Such an effort to
better understand the Court’s judgment appears overdue as privacy pro-
tections in Europe and elsewhere are likely to change significantly in the
7. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 [hereinafter Google
Spain SL v. AEPD].
8. See id. para. 80; see also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Case C-131/12,
Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario
Costeja González, 2013 ECLI:EU:C2013:424, para. 1 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 4, at 195) [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v.
AEPD, 2013].
9. See Danny Hakim, Right to Be Forgotten? Not That Easy, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2014), http://nyti.ms/1hD5Lu6 (noting the divergence between European and American
views on privacy). Compare Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to ‘Forget’, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html
(criticizing the decision as “a form of censorship, one that would most likely be unconstitu-
tional if attempted in the United States”) and Ann Cavoukian & Christopher Wolf, Sorry,
But There’s No Online ‘Right to Be Forgotten’, NAT’L POST (June 25, 2014), http://www.http://
news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/ann-cavoukian-and-christopher-wolf-sorry-but-theres-
no-online-right-to-be-forgotten (arguing the decision is wrong on policy grounds and an af-
front to the First Amendment), with David Hoffman, The Right to Be Relevant Through
Obscurity: Why the European Court of Justice Decision is Not Surprising, POLICY@INTEL
(July 16, 2014), http://blogs.intel.com/policy/2014/07/16/europes-new-right-forgotten-new-for-
getting/ (positing that the CJEU decision is about a right to be relevant); Evan Selinger &
Woodrow Hartzog, Google Can’t Forget You, But It Should Make You Hard to Find, WIRED
(May 20, 2014, 3:33 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/05/google-cant-forget-you-but-it-
should-make-you-hard-to-find/ (casting the decision as part of a debate about “the proper
way to enhance or preserve obscurity”); Eric Posner, We All Have the Right to Be Forgotten,
SLATE (May 14, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_
chicago/2014/05/the_european_right_to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html
(praising the decision as a “pragmatic and flexible” balancing of freedom of expression and
privacy interests), and “Urteil ist ein Sieg der Bürgerrechte,” NDR.DE, http://www.ndr.de/info/
sendungen/interviews/Interview-mit-Johannes-Caspar,.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2014) (quot-
ing Hamburg DPA, Johannes Caspar, as calling the decision a “victory for citizens’ rights”).
10. See James. Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Lib-
erty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1160 (2004).
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coming years,11 for example, by means of the EU Commission’s pending
General Data Privacy Regulation.12
I. CONTEXT
A. The Legal Framework
The State’s abuse of personal information during the Second World
War and Cold War left a strong cultural mark on the European Union.13
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the right to privacy was ele-
vated to the level of a human right internationally (United Nations Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights),14 as well as in Europe (European
Convention on Human Rights).15 While the popular fear was originally a
fear of intrusion by government, it evolved to encapsulate skepticism of
large corporate databases, lest those data collections be used for abusive
purposes.16 By the 1980s, the Organization for Co-Operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) had issued “Recommendations of the Council Concern-
ing Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border
Flows of Personal Data,”17 and the European Council (not an EU institu-
tion) followed suit with its “Convention for Protection of Individuals with
11. See Julie Brill, FTC Comm’r, Privacy in the Age of Omniscience: Approaches in
the United States and Europe, Address at the Mentor Group Vienna Forum (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/581751/140911mentorgroup
.pdf.
12. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25,
2012) [hereinafter Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation].
13. But see Whitman, supra note 10, at 1164-71 (noting that the notion of controlling
dignity and personal honor predates the 20th-century reactions to fascism and is properly
understood as a “leveling up” of the general population to privileges previously reserved for
members of aristocratic and monarchical societies).
14. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
15. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 005.
16. See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regula-
tion Information Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other Government
Data Systems, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366, 368 (2006):
Take as an extreme example the effort in the 1930s by the Netherlands to redesign
their population information systems. The clear purpose of this endeavor was to
improve administrative efficiency. However, part of the data that they collected for
innocent reasons, was each citizen’s religious affiliation. Catastrophically, these
data systems fell into the hands of the Nazis, and, arguably, as a result, Dutch Jews
were killed at a much higher rather than any other Jews in Western Europe during
the Holocaust.
17. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Recommen-
dations of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
Border Flows of Personal Data, C(80)58/FINAL (Sept. 23, 1980).
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Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.”18 Because the con-
ventions were not self-executing, however, data protections continued to
vary widely among member states as they enacted their own data protec-
tion laws.19 Moreover, new technologies posed evolving privacy challenges
to “harmonizing” and thus integrating the EU into a single market.20
Meanwhile, the free flow of data between member states became increas-
ingly important to fostering the integration of the EU’s internal market.21
Hence, the idea of a pan-European data protection directive was born.22
In late 1995, when broad access to the Internet was still a new phe-
nomenon,23 the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers
adopted Directive 96/46 “on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data.”24
Providing a framework for harmonizing data protection laws across mem-
ber states, the Directive had a dual purpose: ensuring the free flow of data
within the European Union while protecting the fundamental right to pri-
vacy.25 The Directive was addressed to the member states and required
them to pass implementing legislation by late 1998.26 In implementing leg-
islation within the Directive’s framework, each member state was to set up
a minimum of one “supervisory authority” (later termed “Data Protection
Authorities” or “DPAs”) for monitoring and enforcing compliance with
the member state’s implementing legislation within the territory of the
member state.27 Any person could directly contact the DPAs to claim in-
fringements of data privacy rights (by both government and private ac-
tors).28 DPA decisions were made subject to appeal before member state
courts.29 In 1999, Spain passed its implementing legislation, which pro-
vided for the amendment of a supervisory authority, the Agencia Espa-
ñola de Protección de Datos (AEPD).30
18. Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Process-
ing of Personal Data, opened for signature, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108.
19. See Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International
Relations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655, 668-69 (2002).
20. CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ONLINE BUSI-
NESS 29 (2003).
21. CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE COMPLI-
ANCE AND REGULATION, xi (2d ed. 2006) (“Information has become the new raw material of
the world economy. Just as, in past centuries, iron, wood, and coal were the foundation upon
which the economy was based, so nowadays it is data and information.”).
22. See Salbu, supra note 19, at 668.
23. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 27-28.
24. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
25. Id. art. 1(2).
26. See id. arts. 32-34.
27. See id. art. 28.
28. Id. art. 28(4).
29. Id. art. 28(3).
30. Ley Orgánica de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal (Law on the Protection
of Personal Data) (L.O.P.D. 1999, 15) (Spain). See generally Rafi Azim-Khan, Dominic
Hodgkinson, Alessandro Liotta & John L. Nicholson, New Spanish Regulation Tightens Up
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B. Public Sentiment in the EU
Leading up to the judgment, there had been numerous calls by politi-
cians, regulators, academics, competitors, and traditional news media
across the EU to constrain Google’s power,31 and subject its unknown
quantities of servers, containing vast amounts of personal data, to EU
law.32 Moreover, European skepticism of entrusting U.S. technology com-
panies with large quantities of personal data was particularly high in light
of the Edward Snowden revelations.33 The company’s market share in the
EU search business continued to hover around ninety percent.34 At the
same time, a long-running Commission investigation into possible viola-
tions of competition law appeared to be near a settlement without any
findings of wrongdoing.35 The Commission set out to increase Google’s
tax liability in the EU.36 A new General Data Protection Regulation with
an explicit right to be forgotten had been discussed extensively since its
introduction in January 2012 but was not scheduled to be adopted before
2016.37 EU politicians and regulators attributed the delay to extensive lob-
bying of EU institutions by U.S. technology firms—including Google,
Facebook, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—aiming to water down
Data Protection Requirements, PILLSBURY.COM, http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/
new-spanish-regulation-tightens-up-data-protection-requirements (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
31. See Mathias Döpfner, An Open Letter to Eric Schmidt: Why We Fear Google,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/
mathias-doepfner-s-open-letter-to-eric-schmidt-12900860.html (publicizing a response to a
letter to Google Chairman, Eric Schmidt, from the head of Axel Springer AG, one of Eu-
rope’s largest publishing houses); Volker Zastrow, Zum Tode von Frank Schirrmacher: Neu-
land, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (June 15, 2014), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/zum-
tode-von-frank-schirrmacher-neuland-12990725.html (noting that the late publisher of one of
Europe’s most prominent newspapers was “proud” to have “majorly contributed” to the
Court’s ruling).
32. See Sebastian Anthony, Microsoft Now Has One Million Servers – Less Than
Google, But More Than Amazon, Says Ballmer, EXTREMETECH.COM (July 19, 2013, 1:11
PM), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/161772-microsoft-now-has-one-million-servers-
less-than-google-but-more-than-amazon-says-ballmer.
33. See Dan Kaplan, Overseas Companies Reluctant to Use U.S. Cloud After Snowden
NSA Leaks, SCMAGAZINE.COM (July 29, 2013), http://www.scmagazine.com/overseas-compa-
nies-reluctant-to-use-us-cloud-after-snowden-nsa-leaks/article/305046 (citing a survey by
Cloud Security Alliance as revealing that 56% of non-U.S. residents, 62% of whom were
from Europe, believed their companies were less likely to engage U.S. providers of cloud
services in light of the Snowden incident).
34. See Toobin, supra note 3.
35. See Claire Cain Miller & Mark Scott, Google Settles Its European Antitrust Case;
Critics Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2014), http://nyti.ms/LxX5ek.
36. See Ian Allison, Europe Cracks Down on Google, Apple, Facebook and the Data-
Driven Tax Black Hole, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013, 9:18 AM), http://www.ib-
times.co.uk/tax-internet-ec-oecd-google-facebook-apple-529601.
37. See Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 12, art. 17; see
Karin Retzer & Joanna Lopatowska, The Draft EU General Data Protection Regulation:
Where We Are Now and Where We Are Going, MOFO.COM, http://media.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/131113-draft-eu-data-protection.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
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the Regulation’s requirements.38 German publishers, for their part, had
successfully lobbied the German parliament for the passage of ancillary
copyright legislation aimed at a share of search-engine revenues,39 but the
actual effect of the new law remained uncertain. On the other hand, mem-
ber state high courts had ruled against Google in a number of important
cases.40 In short, there were ample reasons for EU institutions to demon-
strate their responsiveness to public and media concerns about the state of
privacy rights in light of technological change.
C. Mr. Costeja González’s Case
In early 1998, the Spanish newspaper, La Vanguardia Ediciones SL,
published two announcements in its print edition about a real-estate auc-
tion to collect on social-security debts owed by Mr. Mario Costeja Gonzá-
lez, a Spanish lawyer.41 Subsequently, the newspaper made these
announcements available on its website.42
In November 2009, Mr. Costeja González contacted the newspaper
directly, requesting that the two announcements be removed as irrelevant,
given that the proceedings against him had been concluded years ago.43
When he had searched for his name on Google, the results included links
to the newspaper’s announcements.44 The publisher, however, refused to
remove the two webpages from its website, arguing that the publication
was lawful pursuant to an order of the Spanish Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs.45
Having been turned away by the publisher, Mr. Costeja González pro-
ceeded to ask Google Spain to remove the two search results when search-
38. See April Dembosky & James Fontanella-Khan, US Tech Groups Criticized for EU
Lobbying, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2013, 9:19 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e29a717e-6df0-
11e2-983d-00144feab49a.html#axzz3IDN3LrlV; see also Gregor Thüsing, Datenschutz als
Persönlichkeitsschutz, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.faz.net/ak-
tuell/politik/die-gegenwart/datenschutz-datenschutz-als-persoenlichkeitsschutz-12555555
.html.
39. See Ole Reißmann, Umstrittenes Internetgesetz: Bundesrat winkt Leistungsschut-
zrecht durch, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/
umstrittenes-gesetz-bundesrat-fasst-leistungsschutzrecht-nicht-an-a-890351.html; TAZ, Lob-
bying wie aus dem Lehrbuch, DIE TAGESZEITUNG (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.taz.de/!112000/;
see also Greg Sterling, Following Germany’s Lead Spain Passes Misguided “Google Tax”
Anti-Piracy Law, SEARCHENGINELAW.COM, http://searchengineland.com/spain-follows-ger-
many-passing-google-tax-guide-copyright-protection-207103 (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
40. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGHZ] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 25, 2011, Gewer-
blicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 311 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGHZ]
[Federal Court of Justice] May 14, 2013, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
[GRUR] 751 (Ger.).
41. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 14; Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen,
Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 18.
42. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2013, para.
18.
43. Id. para. 19.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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ing for his name.46 In turn, Google Spain forwarded the request to the
operator of its search engine, Google Inc., in California.47 Meanwhile, Mr.
Costeja González—finding “it too far and difficult to launch a complaint
in the U.S.”—proceeded to file a complaint with the AEPD.48 He sought
to enjoin the newspaper from publishing his personal information on these
two pages, or else alter the pages in such a way as to prevent them from
appearing in search engines.49 In addition, Mr. Costeja González claimed
that Google Inc. or Google Spain should be required to remove or conceal
the two search results when searching for his name.50 He maintained his
legal theory that the proceedings had been resolved and dated back a
number of years, and that therefore, reference to them had grown
irrelevant.51
In July 2010, the AEPD’s director concluded that the newspaper’s
continued publication of the announcements was legal due to the Ministry
of Labour and Social Affairs’ order, whose objective had been to solicit a
maximum number of bidders for the auction.52 Conversely, the AEPD up-
held the complaint as against Google Spain and Google Inc., reasoning
that search engines are subject to Member State data-protection imple-
menting legislation due to their role as data processors.53 Having thus con-
cluded that Google’s search engine fell within the jurisdiction of the
AEPD for data-privacy purposes, the AEPD held it had power to require
search engines to remove or block access to data that compromises the
“fundamental right to data protection and the dignity of persons in the
broad sense.”54 This power, the AEPD concluded, could be invoked by
any subject of such data who “wish[ed]” that “such data not be known to
third parties.”55 Moreover, the AEPD imposed direct, or primary, liability
on search engines without requiring data subjects to contact the publisher
of data first.56
Google Spain and Google Inc. appealed the decision to the adminis-
trative chamber of the Audiencia Nacional, Spain’s national appellate tri-
46. Id. para. 20.
47. Id.
48. Id. para. 21.
49. See id. para. 20; Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
para. 15; see also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Es-
pañola de Protección de Datos, 2013, paras. 41-42 (explaining how website publishers can
exclude pages from being indexed by using a short code).
50. Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, para. 15.
51. Id.
52. Id. para. 16.
53. Id.
54. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 17.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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bunal for administrative proceedings, including those of the AEPD.57 In
order to answer whether a search-engine operator, when prompted by a
data subject, has an obligation to remove results linking to third-party
websites containing personal data, the Audiencia Nacional stayed the pro-
ceedings and referred a detailed set of preliminary questions about the
interpretation of the Directive to the CJEU.58 These questions pertained
to the implemented Directive’s territorial scope, its applicability to search
engines, and the extent of individual rights granted by the Directive:
whether the Directive establishes a so-called right to be forgotten.59 The
Greek, Italian, Austrian, and Polish governments, as well as the European
Commission, joined the proceedings.60
D. Overview of the Court’s Response
The Court answered the interpretive questions referred by the
Audiencia Nacional in the following way: First, it held that search-engine
operators are subject to the Directive as processors of personal data pur-
suant to Articles 2(b) and (d).61 Second, it asserted personal jurisdiction
under Article 4(1)(a) when a search-engine operator establishes a branch
or subsidiary in a member state to promote and sell advertising on the
search engine and directs its activity at the member state’s population.62
Third, the Court recognized, pursuant to Articles 12(b) and 14(a), a natu-
ral person’s general right to request—and search-engine operators’ obliga-
tion to comply with—the removal of third-party search results appearing
when searching for her name and containing information relating to her
person, even if the information is not previously or simultaneously re-
moved from the publisher’s website itself.63 In addition, this general right
is not contingent upon a finding of prejudice to the data subject in order
for the information to be removed.64 Finally, the Court held that informa-
tion’s lawfulness changes over time, and that, in light of the fundamental
rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union,65 the data subject’s rights “override, as a rule,” both the
economic interest of the operator and the general public’s interest in the
information.66
57. Id. para. 18; PODER JUDICIAL ESPANA, http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-
Judicial/Audiencia-Nacional/Informacion-institucional/Como-funciona-la-AN (last visited
Oct. 30, 2014).
58. Id. paras. 19-20.
59. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2012, Reference for a Preliminary Rul-
ing, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-131/12 (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
60. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD.




65. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 7-8, Dec. 18, 2000,
2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter].
66. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 100.
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The Court referred the case back to the Audiencia Nacional to apply
these interpretations of the Directive to the case at hand.67
II. JURISDICTION OVER SEARCH ENGINES OUTSIDE THE EU
A. Ratione Materiae: The Directive’s Applicability to Search Engines
In order for search engines to fall within the scope of the Directive,
the Court first had to establish that the case involved personal data.68 The
Directive’s broad definition of such data as “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable [data subject]”69 clearly extended to bankruptcy
auction notices bearing Mr. Costeja González’s name.70 Even if “personal
data” was involved, however, the Court also had to address whether
search engines “process” such data.71 The Court built on its own case
law72 and the text of the Directive—which refers to collecting, retrieving,
recording, organizing, storing, disclosing, and making available personal
data—to conclude that search engines “collect[ ]” and “retrieve[ ]” per-
sonal data by “exploring the [I]nternet automatically, constantly and sys-
temically” before “record[ing],” “organis[ing],” “stor[ing],” “disclos[ing],”
and “mak[ing] available” such information.73 It thus rejected the argu-
ment that search engines don’t “process” such data because no human in-
teraction with the data gathered, indexed, and displayed actually occurs.74
These determinations alone, however, would not have subjected
search engines to the positive removal obligations for search results sought
by Mr. Costeja González. Rather, the Court also had to find search en-
gines to be “controllers” of personal data. Article 2(d) defines the term as
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data.”75 Having already concluded that search
engines process personal data, the Court swiftly reasoned that these search
engines also determine the purposes and means of their processing activ-
ity.76 The Court found further support for this construction in the Direc-
67. See id.
68. See Directive 95/46, supra note 24, at art. 1(1); cf. Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg [OLGZ] [Hamburg Higher Regional Court] Nov. 13, 2009, MultiMedia und Recht
[MMR] 141 (Ger.) (noting, inter alia, that the German implementing legislation of the Direc-
tive did not apply to search engines).
69. Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 2(a).
70. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2013,
para. 71.
71. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 21.
72. Id. para. 26 (citing Case C-101/01, Sweden v. Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971,
para. 25 (holding that loading of personal data onto a website constitutes “processing”)).
73. Id. para. 28.
74. See id. paras. 22, 41.
75. Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 2(d) (emphasis added).
76. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 33.
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tive’s objective of ensuring effective protection of the data subjects’
rights.77
In contrast, Google argued that website publishers, not search-engine
operators, should be held responsible as website publishers could indicate
to the search engine’s robots to exclude webpages from being indexed by
use of a simple code.78 But even if this meant that the “purposes and
means” of processing were determined jointly between the search-engine
operator and the website publisher, the Directive’s text, according to the
Court, allowed imposition of liability on search engines irrespective of the
publisher’s liability.79 Moreover, the Court stated that the search engine’s
processing is separate and additional to that conducted by host sites them-
selves because of search engines’ instrumental role in disseminating third-
party data and providing a “structured overview” of information relating
to the individual,80 thus causing additional harm to that of the source pub-
lication. In other words, the Directive’s fundamental-rights guarantees
could not be effectuated if search engines were to be outside the scope of
the Directive.81 The Court thus concluded that search-engine operators
are “controllers.”82
B. Tensions in the Court’s Reasoning
Deeming search engines “controllers” (for purposes of asserting juris-
diction under the Directive) creates a number of potential complica-
tions.83 As Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen pointed out in his findings,
a broad, “blind literal” interpretation of “controller” might lead to absurd
results.84 Moreover, such an interpretation might exceed the intentions of
the Community legislators who passed the Directive in 1995 when the In-
ternet’s trajectory of encompassing a comprehensive, global, widely acces-
sible database of the world’s information arguably could not have been
foreseen.85 For example, employing the Court’s interpretation, an ordi-
nary Internet user who downloads the Court’s judgment to her computer,
not strictly for personal purposes, could be considered a “controller.”86 In
other words, ordinary Internet users would be subject to the compliance
obligations of controllers under the Court’s interpretation of the Directive.
The Court, however, seems to have guarded against such an interpretation
77. Id. para. 34.
78. Id. para. 39.
79. Id. para. 40.
80. Id. paras. 35-37.
81. Id. para. 38.
82. Id. paras. 33-34.
83. See id. paras. 32-41.
84. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 29-30,
81.
85. See id. paras. 27-28.
86. Id. para. 29; see also THE EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, EU DATA PROTECTION
LAW: A ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’?, 2014-5, H.L. 40, at 16-17, (U.K.).
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by means of its additional-harm theory,87 which singles out search engines
for purposes of the Directive and thus protects or shields other Internet
users from being subject to the Directive’s requirements. Thus, even if the
definition might be extended to other large-scale intermediaries,88 it does
not lend itself to include the unassuming individual the Advocate General
was concerned about.
Yet, another objection is less easily dismissed: How can a search en-
gine comply with the positive data processing and data-quality obligations
imposed on controllers under Articles 6 and 7?89 For instance, how can a
search engine ensure that a data subject cannot be identified any “longer
than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected,”
given the quantity of data indexed?90 And how is a search engine to en-
sure that it processes personal data “only if the data subject has unambigu-
ously given his consent”?91 The absurd consequence would be that search
engines themselves would be illegal under EU law.92 To avoid such an
outcome, Advocate General Jääskinen argued that the Court should apply
a rule of reason as it had done in Lindquist, thus not rendering search
engines “controllers” of personal data.93 However, another way out of this
conundrum is to refrain from taking the Court’s reasoning to its logical
extreme, that is, curtail the controller obligations of Articles 6 and 7 to
constitute mere ex post obligations when a data subject puts the search
engine on notice. The Court might have implicitly endorsed this approach
by failing to address this problem.
Of course, the Court had to deem search engines “controllers” of per-
sonal data in order to find the Directive applicable, stating, for instance,
that “it [could] not be accepted” that Google should escape liability.94 A
legal realist would be inclined to infer that the Court sacrificed—or rather
deferred grappling with—the logical integrity of the Directive in order to
rule on the fundamental rights questions at the core of the reference ac-
tion, which the Court evidently cared about deeply.95 On the other hand, a
more charitable reader would find justification for the Court’s broad defi-
nition of the term “controller” emanating from the Directive—the logic of
87. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 80, 87.
88. See Albert Gidari, Jr., The Right to Be Forgotten, Everywhere, PERKINS COIE (June
4, 2014), http://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/the-right-to-be-forgotten-everywhere
.html (noting that the judgment “eviscerates” the separate corporate identity doctrine).
89. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras.
89-90.
90. Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 6(e).
91. See id. art. 7(a).
92. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2013,
para. 90.
93. Id. para. 30 (citing Case C-101/01, Sweden v. Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971,
paras. 67-70).
94. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 58.
95. See id. para. 34.
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which Advocate General Jääskinen criticized96—and credit the Court’s
implicitly permissive interpretation of controller obligations as correcting
any potential absurdities. No matter one’s understanding, the problem is
likely to come to the fore when, in future litigation, a claimant questions
search-engine operators’ processing of data without prior blanket ex ante
compliance with controller obligations.
C. Ratione Personae: The Relevance of the Search Engine’s Location
The Directive specifies the circumstances under which member states
must exercise jurisdiction under their respective implementing legisla-
tion.97 Accordingly, such legislation is applicable where “the processing is
carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the con-
troller on the territory of the Member State.”98 Google Inc.’s Spanish es-
tablishment, Google Spain SL, possessed separate legal personality.99 But
the Court relied on Recital 19 in the Directive’s preamble to exclude the
legal form of an establishment in a member state as a jurisdictional
shield.100 For purposes of privacy claims against search-engine operators,
the Court thus rejected what is known as the “separate corporate identity
doctrine.”101
Google Inc., however, would not be subject to the provisions of mem-
ber state implementing legislation merely by having an establishment in
the EU. The data processing of Google Inc.’s search engine also had to
occur “in the context of the activities of an establishment of the control-
ler.”102 Since Google Spain merely promoted the sale of advertising and
did not operate Google Inc.’s search engine,103 the Spanish subsidiary
could not be considered the controller of the personal data in question.104
Therefore, the Court had to find that Google Inc.’s data processing oc-
curred “in the context of the activities” of Google Spain.105
96. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2013,
para. 10, 76-83.
97. See Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 4.
98. Id. art. 4(1)(a); Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 50 (emphasis added).
99. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 49 (emphasis added).
100. Id. paras. 48-49; Directive 95/46, supra note 24, preamble 19 (“Whereas establish-
ment on the territory of a Member State implies the effective and real exercise of activity
through stable arrangements; whereas the legal form of such an establishment, whether sim-
ply branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in this re-
spect; whereas, when a single controller is established on the territory of several Member
States, particularly by means of subsidiaries, he must ensure, in order to avoid any circum-
vention of national rules, that each of the establishments fulfills the obligations imposed by
the national law applicable to its activities.”)
101. See Gidari, supra note 88 (noting that the judgment “eviscerates” the separate cor-
porate identity doctrine).
102. Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 4(1)(a) (emphasis added).
103. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 43, 51.
104. Id. para. 51.
105. Id. para. 50.
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Formally, the Court reached this conclusion by citing the text: “in the
context of” the establishment’s activities is less restrictive than “by” the
establishment.106 The Court also bolstered this reading with teleological
arguments (the Directive’s purpose of protecting the fundamental right to
privacy of natural persons)107 and by referring to the legislative intent of
foreclosing technical circumvention of the Directive (as evidenced by Re-
citals 18 and 20 of the preamble).108 Yet, the fact that the advertising reve-
nues produced by Google Spain feed back into and thereby help sustain
the existence of the search engine that is run by its parent might ultimately
have swayed the Court.109 In other words, the Court appears to have fol-
lowed the money to conclude that the parent and its local establishment
were “inextricably linked.”110
Unfortunately, for purposes of legal certainty, the Court neglected to
answer definitively which of the factors mentioned were dispositive to its
conclusion. In addition, the Court declined to address the jurisdictional
impact of two other potentially dispositive conditions the Audiencia Na-
cional inquired about,111 and thereby left the conditions’ independent ju-
risdictional impact unanswered. Similarly, it did not address questions as
to whether, absent an establishment in a member state, jurisdiction could
arise under public international law, or by making use of equipment within
EU territory.112 This suggests that the Court meant to avoid a broad juris-
dictional holding that could be applied in areas outside of privacy law.
Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling is unambiguous as to search engines
operated abroad: member state jurisdiction for privacy claims exists where
there is an establishment in a member state intended to help fund and
promote the operation of the search engine.113 Of course, this rationale is
not inherently limited to search engines; in principle, it might be extend-
able to any controller of personal data anywhere with an establishment in
a member state and intentions to promote and sell ads for its data process-
ing product.114 Because the Court merely required the local subsidiary to
“intend[ ] to promote and sell [search-engine] advertising” that is directed
106. Id. para. 52.
107. Id. paras. 53, 58 (“[I]t cannot be accepted” that Google “should escape the obliga-
tions and guarantees” of the Directive).
108. See id. para. 54.
109. Id. para. 55; see also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v.
AEPD, 2013, para. 64.
110. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 56.
111. See id., paras. 45, 59 (stating that not addressing the impact of the parent com-
pany’s listing of a member state subsidiary as the representative and controller for two filing
systems, or the local subsidiary’s forwarding of legal requests to the parent company).
112. Id. para. 60; cf. Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 12,
art. (3)(3) (“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not
established in the Union, but in a place where the national law of a Member State applies by
virtue of public international law.”).
113. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 60.
114. See Gidari, supra note 88.
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at the population of the member state exercising jurisdiction,115 the word-
ing is not even limited to actual sales or promotion of advertising. The
judgment’s language thus lends itself to a reading of a low threshold of
mere intent behind a local subsidiary. The Court will need to clarify in
future cases whether it meant this language to be taken to its logical
conclusion.
In sum, the member state-subsidiary basis for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion not only eliminates the shield of the ‘separate corporate identity’ doc-
trine but also provides a potent sword for assertions of personal
jurisdiction under the Directive.116
III. THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
A. The Kind of Right Involved (A Primer)
When asked about the Court’s decision, Mr. Costeja González ex-
claimed that what he “did was to fight for the right to request the deletion
of data that violates the honor, dignity and reputation of individuals.”117
As Yale University law professor, James Whitman, points out, what
Europeans perceive of as privacy differs significantly from common per-
ceptions in the United States.118 Whereas continental Europeans in this
context tend to think first and foremost about dignity of natural persons
and their ability to control the information disclosed about themselves,
that is, the right to control one’s public image,119 Americans primarily
(though by no means exclusively) perceive of privacy as liberty from intru-
sion by the government, “especially in one’s own home.”120 Accordingly,
Americans are much more worried about their “private sovereignty within
[their] own walls”—at least traditionally.121 In contrast, Europeans states
have developed various legal regimes aimed at protecting a sense of
personhood.122
Thus, the right here primarily concerns a continental-style (dignity)
right to control one’s public image. This right was termed the “right to be
115. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 60 (emphasis added).
116. Note, however, that extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction over Internet content
hosted outside of the EU (including in the U.S.) is not a new phenomenon in Europe. For
instance, the German Federal Court of Justice did just that in 2010, asserting jurisdiction over
an archived online news article in the New York Times that pertained to a German resident.
Applying the factor of “directed to,” the Court held that jurisdiction is established where the
content in question contains a clear reference to a location in Germany. Cf. Bundesgericht-
shof [BGHZ] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 3, 2010, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht [GRUR] 461 (Ger.).
117. Reuters, The Man Who Sued Google to Be Forgotten, NEWSWEEK (May 30, 2014,
2:13 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/man-who-sued-google-be-forgotten-252854.
118. Whitman, supra note 10, at 1155-60.
119. Id. at 1160-64.
120. Id. at 1161.
121. Id. at 1162.
122. Id. at 1163.
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forgotten,”123 but has also been called a right to irrelevancy and a right to
obscurity.124 Labels aside, its goal is to give natural persons a say in what
cannot appear in search engines about them.
B. The Basic Contours of the Right to Be Forgotten
The Audiencia Nacional asked the Court whether a search-engine op-
erator has an obligation under Article 12(b) (right to erasure) or Article
14(a) (right to object) to remove third-party search results that contain
information about the data subject and appear when searching for the data
subject’s name, even if the third-party website does not remove the infor-
mation or the publication of the information is lawful.125 The Court again
framed the question in terms of the “high level of protection of fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms of natural persons” sought by the Directive and
backed by Articles 7 (respect for private and family life) and 8 (protection
of personal data) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.126 Moreover, the Court pointed out the two-sided principle of pro-
tection found in Recital 25 of the preamble, which states that the Directive
both confers rights and imposes obligations.127 It then proceeded to inter-
pret the two provisions inquired about by the referring court.
Article 12(b) requires member states to ensure that every data subject
has a “right to obtain from the controller as appropriate the rectification,
erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with
the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or
inaccurate nature of the data.”128 The Court interpreted this obligation to
extend to compliance with all of the Directive’s personal data processing
requirements—not just primarily incomplete or inaccurate data.129 The
Court further specified that—subject to a member state’s exceptions in
areas such as national security, defense, or public security—all processing
of personal data first had to comply with Article 6’s requirements and sub-
sequently with those of Article 7.130 Yet, as in the material scope analysis,
the Court failed to state specifically whether these are ex ante obligations,
123. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGET-
TING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009).
124. Selinger & Hartzog, supra note 9.
125. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 62.
126. Id. para. 66 (citing Case C-473/12, Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers v.
Geoffrey Englebert, ECLI:EU:C:2013:715, para. 28, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0473&from=EN (last visited Oct. 30, 2014)); Charter,
supra note 65; see also Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 3, 68; cf. Opinion of Advocate
General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 126 (observing that Charter was not
meant to widen the scope of EU law).
127. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 67.
128. Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 12(b) (emphasis added).
129. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 70.
130. Id. para. 71. (noting that whereas Article 6 requires member states’ implementing
legislation to ensure qualitative requirements for the processing of personal data, including
fairness, lawfulness, relevancy, and timeliness of information identifying a data subject, Arti-
cle 7 additionally requires a positive, legitimate reason for such processing.)
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as the Directive’s text would suggest.131 But it provided a clue as to the
mode of construction of these provisions, stating that controllers (only)
“must take every reasonable step” to ensure compliance.132 Thus, the
Court appears to have foreclosed a “blind literal” reading the Advocate
General Jääskinen had warned against in the material scope context, opt-
ing for a reasonableness approach to search engine obligations instead.133
For purposes of Article 12(b), the Court stopped short of recognizing
search engines as acting in the public interest under Article 7(e), that is, an
independent legitimating reason not subject to being trumped by other
rights or interests.134 Instead, it only conceded that search-engine opera-
tors’ data processing is “capable of being” considered a legitimate interest
under Article 7(f),135 laying the groundwork for a balancing of rights.
Thus, in accordance with the text of Article 7(f), the search engine’s inter-
est is only legitimate so long as it is not “overridden” by the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject under Article 1(1) of the Directive
and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.136
In addition to bringing a claim pursuant to Article 12(b), a data sub-
ject may also object to processing under Article 14(a) “on compelling le-
gitimate grounds relating to his particular situation” as outlined in Articles
7(e) and 7(f).137 The Court stated that the balancing that would occur
under Article 14(a) would be more specific to the particular circum-
stances.138 But given that a data subject thus would have to justify his
objection, there seems to be little if any incentive to pursue a claim under
14(a) as opposed to 12(b). This is even more so as the Court in passing
gave search-engine operators an additional defense in the form of Article
7(e)’s unconditional public-interest legitimating reason, which it failed to
mention in its analysis of Article 12(b).139 It remains to be seen whether
such subtle, yet potentially significant, differences in the interpretation of
search-engine obligations under the two articles will remain distinct or
morph into one claim that will be treated alike.140
Moreover, the Court firmly established the significance of timeliness
of personal data,141 stating that Article 6(c) to (e) also requires that data
be “adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes” of
131. See Directive 95/46, supra note 24, arts. 6, 7.
132. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 72 (emphasis added).
133. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2013, para.
30.
134. Cf. id. paras. 36, 121 (noting that their role was “crucial for the information society,
and [that] their liability for third-party content [in other areas] . . . ha[d] been limited in order
to facilitate their legitimate activities.”).
135. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 73.
136. Id. para. 74.
137. Id. para. 76.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 7(e).
140. Unfortunately, briefs are not open to the public for CJEU cases.
141. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 92.
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the data processing.142 This means that data that was once processed law-
fully might “age” to become inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive, thus out-
living its legitimate inclusion in search results for the data subject’s name.
When this point is reached, the Court concluded that the information must
be removed.143 But the Court provided no specifics as to when informa-
tion is no longer relevant, or whether this may differ depending on the
kind of information involved. This could provide an opening for future
reference actions but also creates substantial legal uncertainty in the
meantime. As expected in a reference action merely interpreting EU
law,144 the Court refrained from explicitly applying this principle to Mr.
Costeja González’s case, as the original publication dated back sixteen
years. Rather, the Court stated that “it should be held” that announce-
ments be excluded from the search-engine results for his name.145 Thus,
the Court’s de facto application of these terms to the facts of the case at
least provides partial insight into its definition of these terms: claims in-
volving the precise features of Mr. Costeja González’s should result in re-
moval of search results. But this factbound definition hardly provides
helpful guidance to those applying member state law under the Directive’s
framework to different sets of facts. The Court’s subsequent balancing
analysis, however, provides partial relief to the uncertainty.
As to the scope of the removal, the Court only required removal from
the search results for the data subject’s name as opposed to a complete
removal of a given URL from search results.146 At the same time, the
Court failed to specify the country domain or domains from which the
search results should be removed. Therefore the question remains as to
whether a Spanish user has a right to effectuate removals of specific search
results for her name from a search engine’s non-Spanish domains, given
that these domains are similarly accessible from Spanish territory.147
There are at least some hints that could provide a partial answer to this
question. The Court stated that any person—presumptively not just re-
sidents or citizens of a member state—whose request has been rejected by
a search-engine operator, may subsequently take her claim to a member
state DPA, which is to exercise its powers of investigation and intervention
to effectuate a temporary or permanent ban on processing.148 In addition,
142. Id. para. 72.
143. See id.
144. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 15, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) art. 267.
145. Id. para. 98.
146. See id. para. 96.
147. See Friedhalm Greis, Google-Suchergebnisse: EU-Datenschützer verlangen
weltweite Löschung, GOLEM.DE (July 24, 2014, 2:54 PM), http://www.golem.de/news/google-
suchergebnisse-eu-datenschuetzer-verlangen-weltweite-loeschung-1407-108101.html (noting
that DPAs in the EU are asking for worldwide removals); see also Julia Fioretti, Google
Under Fire From Regulators on EU Privacy Ruling, REUTERS, July 24, 2014, http://www
.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/us-google-eu-privacy-idUSKBN0FT1AZ20140724.
148. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 77-78.
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although the Court is quiet on the territorial scope of a DPA’s powers, the
Directive itself states that each authority is limited to the territory of its
member state.149 From this context and the fact that the Court is also si-
lent on standing,150 it seems plausible to conclude that even if the author-
ity of the member state’s DPA is limited to its own territory, a data subject
could at least bring claims to the attention of DPAs across the EU, thereby
effectuating search-result removals from member state domains beyond
her own.
C. The Additional-Harm Theory and its Consequences
As first introduced in the material scope analysis, the Court reiterated
that the harm inflicted by search-engine operators on the data subject’s
rights is separate and distinct from that inflicted by the website pub-
lisher.151 This is so, according to the Court, because the search engine
makes it “appreciably easier” for anyone to obtain a “structured over-
view” of data pertaining to someone else when searching for their name
on a search engine, thus potentially displaying a detailed profile of that
person’s personal data.152 The ubiquitous presence of the Internet today,
says the Court, amplifies such infringement of the data subject’s rights.153
The Court derived several conclusions from this conception of the po-
tential for harm inflicted by search-engine results: first, the Court deemed
it “clear” that data processing cannot be justified merely by the economic
“interest” of the search-engine operator.154 Second, the Court added that,
as a general rule, the data subject’s rights also trump the Charter Article
11 interest of Internet users in the information.155 Third, because the
search-engine operator’s processing is separate and distinct from that of
the website publisher, search engines are directly liable without resort to a
given website’s publisher.156 The first two conclusions will be addressed in
this subsection while the third conclusion will be addressed in the subse-
quent subsection.
The Court’s language could be read as establishing a rebuttable pre-
sumption in favor of the data subject over the search engine’s interest in
149. Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 28(1).
150. Of course the facts of this case did not pose standing obstacles that might have
prompted a narrower holding, given that Mr. Costeja González’s claim pertained to a Span-
ish publication and that he pursued his claim through the institutions of his own member
state.
151. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 80.
152. Id. paras. 80, 87.
153. Id. para. 80.
154. Id. para. 81.
155. Id. paras. 81, 97 (holding that the data subject’s rights “override, as a rule, not only
the economic interest of the operator . . . but also the interest of the general public”). But see
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 120-37.
156. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 83.
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conducting a business,157 the public’s right to having access to informa-
tion,158 and (implicitly) the publisher’s right to free expression.159 There
are at least two non-exclusive reasons for such a presumption. As repeat-
edly stated,160 the Court might simply have considered it sound in terms of
the Directive’s purpose of protecting certain fundamental rights to create
a rebuttable presumption.161 In addition, a presumption partly limits the
role accorded to those who are charged with deciding claims on the
ground, that is, member state DPAs, courts, and search engines. These ac-
tors are thus to decide in principle but only in the limited sphere set by the
Court—perhaps promoting the principle of legal certainty in the EU.162
Secondly, the presumption could be a partial offset for the fact that the
Court did not impose strict (and likely unworkable) ex ante compliance
obligations with Articles 6 and 7.
But the Court clarified that the data subject’s rights are not com-
pletely unchecked or absolute,163 thus pointing either to a balancing anal-
ysis without a presumption or specifying circumstances under which the
presumption may be overcome. To this end, the Court stated that a “fair
balance” depends in some cases on “the nature of the information in ques-
tion and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life,” as well as the
interest of the public in having access to the information, which may vary
depending on the data subject’s role in public life.164 Yet, it is unclear what
the contours and effect of this exception might be. For instance, what kind
of stature in public life would render the exception to personal-data pro-
tection applicable? Would a person running for local office fall under the
exception and for what purposes?
Some member state courts, such as Germany’s, have created nuanced
personality-rights jurisprudence to address such questions.165 For instance,
157. See Charter, supra note 65, art. 16; see also Opinion of Advocate General Jääs-
kinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 124.
158. Charter, supra note 65, art. 11; see Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen,
Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 121.
159. Charter, supra note 65, art. 11; see Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen,
Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 122.
160. See, e.g., Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 3, 58, 66.
161. Note that the Court historically tends to rule in favor of data protection over other
rights. Cf. Laraine Laudati, EU Court Decisions Relating to Data Protection, EC.EUROPA.EU,
Dec. 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/data-protection/dpo/ecj_decisions_relat
ing_data_protection_en.pdf.
162. See generally ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 116 (3d ed. 2013).
163. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 81, 97.
164. Id.
165. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 979 (1997) (“German personality law is . . .
a creature of the [German] Constitutional Court, as rights of privacy are of the [U.S.] Su-
preme Court.”); see also Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in Ger-
man and American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 976 n.59 (1997) (noting that
the notion of free development of personality is fundamentally a Kantian one, which was
developed by jurist Friedrich Carl von Savigny into his theory of autonomy, in turn influenc-
ing Otto von Gierke in his framing of the 1896 German Civil Code, and that the main theo-
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allegedly false statements of fact are treated differently from expressions
of opinion;166 distinctions between spheres of “privacy” may affect the
outcome;167 and the social justification for the removal, for example, when
convicted felons seek to have search-engine results removed so as to bet-
ter reintegrate into society, is factored into the determination.168 With the
Court’s apparent usurpation of this traditional area of member state com-
petency, it remains to be seen whether the Court will develop similar dis-
tinctions in its own online-privacy jurisprudence. Given its mentioning of
exceptions, the Court expressed a willingness to address such factors, and
the Court certainly ensured that future reference actions clarifying excep-
tions will be forthcoming.
In sum, the Court in effect significantly enlarged its own role not only
by recognizing a right to be forgotten and finding search-engine liability in
this area a matter of EU law, but also by circumscribing the adjudicative
role of DPAs, member state courts, and search-engine operators. Finally, it
is also plausible that the Court implicitly sought to give EU political actors
reason to provide clarification by means of the pending General Data Pro-
tection Regulation as to the exceptions as well as the definitions relating to
timeliness of personal data.169
D. The Direct Liability and Procedural Role of Search Engines
Further relying in part on its additional-harm theory, the Court im-
posed direct liability on search engines.170 To support this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that because those responsible for the publication may
sometimes not be subject to EU law and because of the ease with which
information spreads beyond the original source publication online, effec-
tive protection of data subjects could only be achieved by imposing pri-
mary liability on search-engine operators.171 Similarly, the Court found
additional support for holding search engines directly liable by citing the
journalistic purposes exception of Article 9, which applies to websites but
not to search engines.172 This example, according to the Court, reconfirms
retical development of personality rights in Germany paralleled the original development of
privacy rights in America); Gregor Thüsing, Datenschutz als Persönlichkeitsschutz, FRANK-
FURTER ALLGEMEINE, Sept. 1, 2013, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/die-gegenwart/daten-
schutz-datenschutz-als-persoenlichkeitsschutz-12555555.html (explaining that data protection
law and personality-rights law overlap in that the right to individual self-determination is a
personality right derived from Articles 1(1) (human dignity) and 2(1) (free development of
personality) of Germany’s Basic Law).
166. See MARIAN PASCHKE, WOLFGANG BERLIT & CLAUS MEYER, HAMBURGER KOM-
MENTAR - GESAMTES MEDIENRECHT 1020-28 (2d ed. 2011).
167. See id. at 1007-20.
168. See id. at 1015-18.
169. Cf. Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 12.
170. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 83.
171. Id. para. 84.
172. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 85.
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that the requirements imposed on search engines may be separate from
those imposed on the website publishers themselves.173
Some courts in member states, if not all, had previously developed
regimes of search-engine secondary liability.174 In Germany, for instance,
the courts derived the concept of “disturber” liability and later applied it
to alleged personality-rights violations appearing on search engines.175 In
contrast, the Court decided that natural persons may direct their requests
under Article 12(b) and Article 14(a) directly at the controller of informa-
tion, that is, the search-engine operator.176 Whereas the data subject ap-
pears to be under no obligation to make a prima facie case or demonstrate
prejudice to her under Article 12(b),177 she must justify her objection
under Article 14(a).178 The operator is to then “duly examine [the] merits”
and potentially seize processing of the data.179 Search-engine operators—
not courts or DPAs—thus render the initial determination as to the data
subject’s (relative) rights.180 The publisher of the website whose freedom
of expression could be curtailed by hiding search-engine results for her
content is curiously absent from that process.181
Secondary liability is not without merit: First, effective redress argua-
bly could be provided only by the publisher of the website because the
search-engine operator could only remove the search result, not erase the
source of the information itself.182 By separating the harm inflicted by
search-engine results from that of the source publication, however, the
Court appears to have countered that removal of the information dis-
played on search engines could be more effective than the removal from
the publisher’s website itself.183
Second, common procedural rights, such as hearing both sides to a
dispute before making a determination as to their relative rights,184 are
arguably best safeguarded by putting all parties on notice.185 The search-
engine operator should not represent the website publisher or the public
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Thomas Hoeren & Silviya Yankova, The Liability of Internet In-
termediaries: The German Perspective, 43(5) INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
501, 504 (2012) (discussing the German courts perspective on this issue).
175. Id. at 504-06.
176. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 53, 66, 77.
177. See id. para. 99.
178. Id. paras. 76, 100 (stating that decisions on costs under Article 14(a) are a matter
for the court).
179. Id. paras. 77, 98-99.
180. See id. paras. 77-81.
181. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para.
134.
182. See id. para. 109.
183. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 84.
184. Kaczorowska, supra note 162, at 117.
185. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para.
134.
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at large in this process for two reasons: their rights vis-à-vis the party seek-
ing redress may differ (right to free expression or access to information
versus the right to conduct a business); and their economic incentives are
not necessarily interchangeable, potentially resulting in a chilling effect on
the display of information in search results.186
Of course, the Court neither foreclosed nor endorsed the possibility of
notifying website publishers when requests are lodged against their con-
tent.187 Although not an obligation as such, this could at least be read as a
tacit acceptance of such a practice, which the German Federal Court of
Justice in 2011 endorsed for Blogger, Google’s blog-hosting platform.188
While the German court’s process is not without shortcomings of its
own,189 that court at least made an attempt to afford a role to both the
author and the data subject:190 upon receipt of a substantiated request,
Google must notify the owner of the blog in dispute by forwarding the
request to the owner.191 Only if the parties cannot come to terms with
each other or the owner fails to respond, is Google to balance their rights
and remove information accordingly.192
In contrast, the CJEU failed to mandate even such partly effective
steps.193 The mere fact that search-engine operators, unlike providers of
hosted services, might not have the contact information of website pub-
lishers cannot fully account for this omission since fake, or no longer up-
to-date, user contact information for hosted products might be similarly
lacking.194 Alternatively, the Court might have placed little significance in
the chilling effect of incentives for search-engine operators to blindly com-
ply with requests. Or the Court might have trusted an invisible hand of the
market to convince search-engine operators that it would be advantageous
for their business to forward requests and thus bolster their claims to
transparency.195 Perhaps the Court did not share Advocate General Jääs-
kinen’s conception of the role played by search engines as an omnipresent
186. See id. paras. 133-34. The search engine operator arguably has an amplified finan-
cial incentive in complying with removal requests given the scale of its data processing.
187. See James Ball, EU’s Right to Be Forgotten: Guardian Articles Have Been Hidden
by Google, THE GUARDIAN, July 2, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google; Robert Peston, Why Has Google Cast Me
into Oblivion?, BBC News (July 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28130581.
188. Bundesgerichtshof [BGHZ] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 25, 2011, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 311 (Ger.).
189. See Georg Nolte & Jörg Wimmers, Wer stört? Gedanken zur Haftung von In-
termediären im Internet, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Beilage 58 (2014).
190. Bundesgerichtshof [BGHZ] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 25, 2011, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 311 (Ger.).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See generally Kaczorowska, supra note 162.
194. See Nolte & Wimmers, supra note 189, at 65-66.
195. See Ball, supra note 187 (pointing out that Google had notified the paper about the
removal of links to six articles).
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source of information,196 reasoning that non-indexed information on
third-party websites is almost as real and available as information dis-
played on search engines. Finally, it is possible the Court considered a
search engine’s less censored U.S. domain an effective substitute for en-
suring continued access to the information.197 But the Court remained si-
lent, withholding its reasons for not providing for a more rigorous
adversarial process, such as an explicit obligation to notify publishers.198
Thus, in the absence of a legal requirement, those who are left out of the
process between the data subject and the search engine must rely on
search-engine operators’ benevolence, hoping that these operators will
consider sharing requests with website publishers worth their resources
and legal risk.199
IV. THE COURT’S OBJECTIVES
A. Protecting fundamental rights
Although not a human rights court as such,200 the Court has long as-
serted its role in safeguarding the effective protection of fundamental
196. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 10,
36; see also Bundesgerichtshof [BGHZ] [Federal Court of Justice] July 17, 2003, Neue Juris-
tische Wochenschrift [NJW] 3406 (Ger.) (“Ohne die Inanspruchnahme von Suchdiensten und
deren Einsatz von Hyperlinks . . . wäre die sinnvolle Nutzung der unübersehbaren Informa-
tionsfülle im World Wide Web praktisch ausgeschlossen.”) (“Without resort to search ser-
vices and their use of hyperlinks . . . it would be practically impossible to make expedient use
of the vast depth of information on the World Wide Web.”) (author’s translation).
197. See Toobin, supra note 3 (quoting Viktor Mayer-Schönberger as referring to the
decision as merely creating a “speed bump” due to the fact that users could switch to the
search engine’s “.com” domain).
198. This could imply that member states may add their own requirements, or simply
that the Proposed Regulation should add to the Court’s judgment. See Mark Scott, Google
Reinstates European Links to Articles From the Guardian, N.Y. TIMES July 4, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/business/international/google-to-guardian-forget-about-those-
links-right-to-be-forgotten-bbc.html (noting that the Court may have purposefully avoided
giving specific guidance in light of the pending regulation).
199. See Richard Waters, Henry Mance & John Aglionby, Google U-Turn Over Deleted
Newspaper Links, FINANCIAL TIMES (July 3, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/64e37214-02d0-
11e4-a68d-00144feab7de.html#axzz3HroDwzuz (reporting that Google had received about
70,000 removal requests and had hired “an army of paralegals to vet every web address”
before deciding whether to remove links); see also Mark Scott, Google Provides Details on
‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests in E.U., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/google-provides-details-on-right-to-be-forgotten-requests/
(noting that Google’s Transparency Report had revealed that the company to date had re-
ceived 143,000 requests for 491,000 links as a result of the right to be forgotten ruling); Trans-
parency Report: European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE, http://www
.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2014) (provid-
ing ongoing statistics).
200. Patricia R. Waagstein, Human Rights Protection in Europe: Between Strasbourg
and Luxembourg, STANFORD PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL EDUCA-
TION, http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/human_rights_protection_in_europe_between_stras
bourg_and_luxembourg (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
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rights and freedoms within the EU legal order.201 So it should hardly
come as a surprise that the Court continued on this path. From this per-
spective, the Court’s interpretation of the Directive actually appears to
give effect to its text in a rather straightforward manner. After all, Article
1 of the Directive states its purpose unambiguously: “In accordance with
this Directive, member states shall protect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with
respect to the processing of personal data.”202 Thus the Directive’s stated
telos mirrored the Court’s longstanding self-image and role within the
EU.203 Armed with this mandate, it aimed to give people a right to control
their public image in the Internet age—even if seemingly starting from the
desired result and working its way through the Directive’s textual
maize.204 And it confirmed the existence of the right to be forgotten by
drawing on all the authority it could muster by deciding the reference ac-
tion in Grand Chamber and mentioning the importance of the right to
privacy no less than nine times.205 Similarly, in closing, the Court left little
to chance, essentially telling the Audiencia Nacional how to apply the
Court’s interpretation to the facts of the case.206
Some of the effects of the judgment, however, cast doubt on the ulti-
mate effectiveness of any person’s right to be forgotten.207 In line with the
so-called Streisand effect,208 a new independent website has sprung up list-
ing webpages removed from search engines’ European domains.209 More-
over, the Court’s example of imposing primary liability on search-engine
operators and their much-publicized compliance has showcased the techni-
cal means and legal mechanisms for a (further) balkanized Internet.210
The Court’s judgment could thus provide a blueprint to governments
within and outside of the EU to restrict the information available on
201. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: An Ap-
praisal, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1104 (2007).
202. Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 1.
203. See, e.g, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 66; see generally Defeis, supra note 201.
204. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230-68 (2008) (advocating for such
result-oriented judicial reasoning).
205. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 66, 68, 74, 80, 87, 91, 97, 99; see also Opinion
of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 1, 28 (opening his opinion
with a quote from Warren and Brandeis’s Right to Privacy and comparing the changes faced
by the Court to those posed by the invention of the printing press).
206. Google Spain SL v. AEPD, paras. 98-99.
207. Id. para. 78.
208. See Justin Parkinson, The Perils of the Streisand Effect, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE
(July 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28562156 (indicating the definition of the
term is the phenomenon that occurs when an attempt to hide or delete a piece of information
instead results in wider circulation of the information, particularly on the Internet); Roger
Parloff, Enforcing Your ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ May Get You Remembered, FORTUNE (Oct.
7, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/10/07/right-to-be-forgotten.
209. Kevin Rawlinson, ‘Hidden From Google’ Lists Pages Blocked by Search Engine,
BBC NEWS (July 15, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28311217.
210. Toobin, supra note 3, at 32.
674 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:649
search engines, no matter where those search engines are based. This argu-
ment, however, neglects to account for the fact that the balkanization of
the Internet was already underway prior to the judgment,211 and that—at
least within the EU—the immediate effect of the judgment is less rather
than more balkanization. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that the
Court’s judgment does not necessarily lead to enhanced protection of fun-
damental rights.
B. Harmonizing laws across the EU
Starting with its seminal decision in Van Gend,212 the Court has been
a main driver in the legal integration of the EU.213 The effect of the Direc-
tive on search-engine providers did not receive uniform treatment across
the EU prior to the Court’s May 2014 ruling.214 Therefore, the Court
brought a measure of uniformity to the issue by subjecting search-engine
operators to the Directive.
But not only did the Court clarify the applicability of the Directive, it
also in effect brought a significant share of personality-rights jurispru-
dence under the Court’s wing by giving any person a right to have certain
information removed from search results.215 As discussed, this right, as
interpreted by the Court, is broader in scope and considerably less burden-
some on the plaintiff than traditional personality rights. For instance, a
data subject does not have to attempt to approach publishers of informa-
tion first since the Court imposed direct liability on search-engine provid-
ers; a data subject can more easily enforce her right across the EU; and a
data subject does not have to make a prima facie case of illegality. Thus,
data subjects are incentivized to bring or bolster their claims citing their
rights under the Directive, and hence under EU law, which the Court in-
terprets authoritatively.
211. See Michael Hickins, Post-Snowden ‘Balkanization’ of the Internet Should Worry
CIOs, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 4, 2014, 5:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/04/14/
post-snowden-balkanization-of-the-internet-should-worry-cios/tab/print; Sascha Meinrath,
The Future of the Internet: Balkanization and Borders, TIME MAGAZINE (Oct. 11, 2013), http:/
/ideas.time.com/2013/10/11/the-future-of-the-internet-balkanization-and-borders.
212. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1.
213. See Antoine Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the Govern-
ment of the European Union (For a Renewed Research Agenda), 2 INT’L POL. SOC. 128, 131
(2008); see generally Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Right and the European Court of Justice: An
Appraisal, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1104, 1114 (2007) (discussing the CJEU’s leadership in the
integration of human rights law across the EU).
214. See Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [OLGZ] [Hamburg Higher Re-
gional Court] Nov. 13, 2009, MultiMedia und Recht [MMR] 141 (Ger.) (noting, inter alia,
that the German implementing legislation of the Directive did not apply to search engines).
215. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 78; see also Caitlin Dewey, Pianist Asks The
Washington Post to Remove a Concert Review Under the E.U.’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Rul-
ing, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 31, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/
wp/2014/10/31/pianist-asks-the-washington-post-to-remove-a-concert-review-under-the-e-u-s-
right-to-be-forgotten-ruling.
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Of course, it remains to be seen to what extent member states courts
and legislatures will differentiate traditional personality rights from the
privacy rights under the Directive, or find ways to delineate the Directive’s
scope in spite of the judgment—perhaps through the new General Data
Protection Regulation.216 Whatever the response at the EU or member
state level, there can be no doubt that the Court’s judgment increased the
uniformity of privacy rights as against search-engine operators across the
EU,217 and that by moving these issues within the scope of EU fundamen-
tal rights, the Court established itself as the ultimate arbiter of these rights.
C. Controlling Google’s Power
Commentators in Europe interpreted the judgment as an effort to cur-
tail Google’s power.218 The search engine could have responded to the
judgment in one of the following ways. First, it could have decided to redi-
rect requests received to member state DPAs. Not only would this re-
sponse have been problematic in terms of overwhelming leanly staffed
DPAs with requests and thereby likely upsetting a key regulator, it would
also have elevated DPAs to decision makers for tort cases traditionally
handled by member state courts. In addition, the judgment did not clearly
endorse such blanket deference by search-engine operators to DPAs, thus
exposing Google to liability.219 In the alternative, Google could have
opted to quickly develop its capacity to handle requests for removal of
data arising under the judgment.220 Given the vast numbers of requests
potentially involved, the mode of legal review in any such effort would
have had to be scalable;221 it would also be unlikely to approach the level
of scrupulous balancing traditionally performed by member state
courts.222 Furthermore, any such legal review and decision-making would
be performed by a private-sector company instead of a public institu-
tion.223 Finally, basic features of fair legal proceedings, such as proper col-
lection of evidence, hearing of both sides, and transparency would be
absent.224 In other words, there were liability and normative drawbacks to
both alternatives.
Google opted for the second alternative, putting in place an online
form to provide a pipeline for incoming requests, and other search-engine
216. Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 12.
217. See, e.g., Directive 95/46, supra note 24, art. 30(1)(a).
218. See, e.g., Innocenzo Genna, Search Engines, Right to Be Forgotten and Data Pro-
tection: Regulating Google?, RADIOBRUXELLESLIBERA, http://radiobruxelleslibera.wordpress
.com/2014/05/13/search-engines-right-to-be-forgotten-and-data-protection-regulating-google
(last updated May 14, 2014).
219. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 77.
220. See Waters et al., supra note 199.
221. See Scott, supra note 199; Transparency Report, supra note 199.
222. See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para.
133.
223. Id.
224. See id. at para. 134; see also Kaczorowska, supra note 162 at 117.
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providers followed suit.225 In the judgment’s aftermath, Google’s public
mea culpa stressed that the company was not only working urgently to
implement the judgment but was also reevaluating its approach to privacy
in the EU more generally.226 Google assembled a panel of company offi-
cials and outside experts to solicit public feedback in Europe on the com-
pany’s privacy practices.227 In a sign of the public’s desire to exercise their
right to be forgotten, Google alone received over 140,000 individual re-
quests over a span of approximately four months after the judgment.228
But did Google’s compliance have any impact on its power—or
rather, could it have? In terms of the search engine’s market power, the
judgment might actually have created additional barriers to entry for com-
petitors to Google’s search-engine business by imposing significant regula-
tory compliance costs. This potential effect would further cement Google’s
market power and thus run counter to the Commission’s efforts in the
competition field.229 Even prior to the judgment, Google had a monopoly
of the search engine market in Europe with a market share of about ninety
percent.230 As the incumbent firm, Google thus had potential advan-
tages—such as the sunk costs of building a search engine—over new mar-
ket entrants.231 Rebutting this structural concern, Chicago School
225. Dave Lee, Google Sets Up ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Form After EU Ruling, BBC
NEWS (May 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27631001.
226. See Richard Waters, Google’s Larry Page Resists Secrecy But Accepts Privacy Con-
cerns, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 30, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f3b127ea-
e708-11e3-88be-00144feabdc0.html; see also Murad Ahmed & Duncan Robinson, The Big
Stick Behind Google’s Soft Power Approach to Europe, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014,
5:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7f5c3052-3e5f-11e4-a620-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3G
S27w6ul; Cornelius Rahn, Brian Parkin & Stephanie Bodoni, Google’s Schmidt to Soothe
Rattled Germans in Berlin Talks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 14, 2014, 9:06 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-14/google-s-schmidt-heads-to-berlin-talks-to-
soothe-rattled-germans.
227. Jemima Kiss, Google Launches ‘Advisory Council’ Page on Right to Be Forgotten,
THE GUARDIAN, July 11, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/11/google-
advisory-council-page-right-to-be-forgotten.
228. See Scott, supra note 199.
229. See The European Union Committee, supra note 76 (observing that “smaller
search engines would not necessarily be able to comply with this judgment as easily as
Google” and that such smaller engines might “automatically withdraw links to any material
objected to because they would not have the resources to examine requests on a case by case
basis,” thus “effectively allow[ing] any individual an uncontested right of censorship”); see
also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD para. 133 (referring
to the possibility of the major search engine providers receiving an “unmanageable” number
of requests for removal, while new entrants would be even more burdened than the larger
providers).
230. Toobin, supra note 3; see generally Luis Ortiz Blanco, Market Power in EU Anti-
trust Law 57 (Andrew Read trans.) (2011).
231. The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1, 33 (2011) (statement of former Assistant Att’y Gen. Thomas
O. Barnett, testifying for Expedia) (“If you have an 80 percent share of the market with
barriers to entry, you have monopoly power. Those barriers don’t come from the supposed
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economists would argue that the market will regulate itself due to the
dominant firm’s monopoly profits, which will attract new entrants to the
market and eventually lead to the dominant firm’s market power vanish-
ing.232 The more structurally focused Harvard School adherents, examin-
ing impediments to entry, on the other hand, would disagree.233 And the
potentially amplified competitive significance of scale in the search-engine
market only heightens this concern.234
Leaving aside these general points of contention over the nature of
Google’s search-engine monopoly in Europe, new entrants after the
Court’s judgment now face a cost not incurred by Google when it entered
the EU market. Namely, new entrants must comply with the new legal
obligations imposed by the Court, that is, evaluate and process any num-
ber of right-to-be-forgotten requests. In Google’s case, this required “an
army of paralegals” in addition to the technical changes required to imple-
ment the exact type removal sought by the Court in terms of domains and
search query.235 In addition, the ambiguities in the Court’s judgment will
likely result in significant litigation expenses for any companies in this
market. Of course, smaller rivals may face a lesser onslaught of requests—
at least initially. But the fact remains that the burden of these compliance
costs puts new entrants at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Google.
Even the Chicago School’s narrower definition of barriers to entry appears
to recognize this. As the late Chicago economist, George Stigler, noted,
barriers to entry are conditions that impose higher long-run costs of pro-
duction on a new entrant than are borne by the firm already in the mar-
ket.236 In particular, these are non-natural barriers to entry, that is,
barriers created by government itself.237 Thus, the Court’s judgment—
even under the Chicago School’s narrower definition of barriers to entry—
cost of switching or clicking to another site. The barriers come from building an effective
search engine.”).
232. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213,
227 (1985).
233. See SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW:
CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND MEASUREMENT 3-020 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that the greater
the sunk costs are for entry, the likelihood of entry decreases).
234. DOJ Antitrust Division, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
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industry is characterized by an unusual relationship between scale and competitive
performance.”).
235. See Waters et al., supra note 199.
236. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67, 67-69 (1968); see also
Bishop & Walker, supra note 233, at 3-024.
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29 (1978); see, e.g., Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, 11
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is arguably at odds with any efforts to rein in Google’s market power in
the EU.
Yet, the Court might have guarded against such an effect by mention-
ing that a search engine must only ensure compliance with the Directive’s
obligations within the framework of its “powers and capabilities.”238 Such
a reading could provide room for a proportionality defense for smaller
competitors. In the alternative, it will once again be up to the proposed
General Data Protection Regulation to fix any shortcomings of the
CJEU’s judgment.
Commentators have also remarked that the judgment elevated
Google to an important adjudicator of the right to be forgotten, enhancing
the company’s power.239 As previously discussed, the procedure articu-
lated by the Court results in removals from European search indices
through private correspondence between Google and complainants with-
out ever catching the light of day and without (necessarily) providing pub-
lishers and authors of information any opportunity to make their case in
the balancing of rights.240 Thus, there could be chilling effects on speech,
unless the Court’s instruction that search engines must “duly examine”
requests proves to be a legal safeguard against insufficient internal
processes that fail to filter out illegitimate requests.241
This concern over procedural safeguards, transparency, and the rela-
tive weight of rights, however, does not address directly whether the
CJEU put Google into a quasi-judicial role. In some respect, the charac-
terization as an adjudicator might be an overstatement or even a misno-
mer, given that (at least) denied requests may be taken to DPAs or
member state courts, which will review claims de novo and without defer-
ence to Google’s determination. In this respect, Google’s role is quite sim-
ilar to that of any natural or legal person who receives a legal request and
must decide whether to comply with the demand or risk the matter esca-
lating into a lawsuit. From this formal perspective, it is difficult to conceive
of this resource-intensive compliance obligation as enhancing Google’s
power.
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239. See Google Is Not a Legitimate Arbiter, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Sept. 26,
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gines, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2-3 (2004) (noting search engines have handled copyright re-
quests in the U.S. at least since the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
240. See Nancy Scola, Designing ‘The Right to Be Forgotten’, WASHINGTON POST (Aug.
4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/04/designing-the-right-
to-be-forgotten (noting that 53% of requests had resulted in takedowns in the first attempt
and an additional 15% were approved upon further investigation, but that “it is simply im-
possible for Google to ever understand the nuances about which it is being required to
adjudicate.”).
241. See Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 77; see also DPA, Google soll weniger lös-
chen, DIE TAGESZEITUNG (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.taz.de/!147701/ (noting that German
consumer-protection regulators had asked Google to remove less frequently).
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But this conception is incomplete. Because for requests granted,
Google in all likelihood will be the only and final level of adjudication. For
who would appeal a granted request to a DPA or a court? Certainly not
the data subject or Google. Thus, whenever Google grants a request, its
determination receives de facto deference by virtue of the CJEU’s proce-
dure. Given the scale of Google’s adjudicatory function, the CJEU may be
said to have turned Google into a key institution in shaping the effect of
the right to be forgotten. Of course the proposed General Data Protection
Regulation provides an opportunity to curtail Google’s (and other search
engine’s) role. For instance, an amendment requiring notification of pub-
lishers or authors of the original content could provide partial relief.
Moreover, regulatory oversight could establish limits to Google’s adjudi-
catory responsibility.242 The Court, however, did precious little to address
this concern.
CONCLUSION
By interpreting the Directive to include a right to be forgotten, the
Court firmly established itself as the ultimate authority on this right across
the EU, moving a significant area of member state law under the umbrella
of the EU. Undoubtedly, the Court thus used this case to enhance its own
role compared to other EU and member state institutions. But moreover,
it demonstrated a willingness to take on powerful interests by imposing
EU regulatory requirements on the U.S.-based technology sector—even if
many of the effects of the judgment remain to be seen. Last but not least,
the Court took a stand in the public debate over the protection of people’s
privacy in the Internet age. Other high courts likely will take notice of the
judgment and its effects.
To be sure, the judgment leaves plenty of questions unanswered and
arguably might not have struck the right balance between relative rights.
First, the apparent presumption of a data subject’s right over the rights of
others is doctrinally questionable. Second, the Court should have more
clearly defined the contours of the right to be forgotten, for example, in
terms of geographic scope, affected domains, and standing requirements.
Third, the Court should have made more of an effort to define exceptions
to the data subject’s right. Of course, the Court might have felt con-
strained by the facts of the case or decided on a gradual approach to devel-
oping a more intricate doctrine.243 But to the extent the Court considered
its authority to define the doctrine limited by the Directive or the case, it
should have explicitly invited the EU legislator to act.
Whether implicit or explicit, the Court demonstrated its deference to
the EU legislator and left plenty of reasons for them to revisit the issue
242. See DPA, Regierung plant Schlichtungsstelle für ‘Recht auf Vergessen,’ FRANK-
FURTER ALLGEMEINE (May 27, 2014), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/netzwirtschaft/
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243. FTC Public Statement, supra note 11, at 10-11 (noting that the lack of clarity
should be familiar to lawyers in the U.S. legal system, where the contours of a doctrine are
often developed gradually over time).
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with the Proposed Regulation.244 If this was the Court’s intention, it suc-
ceeded. member state politicians have been abuzz with suggestions for im-
proving upon the judgment.245 Not surprisingly, Google and other U.S.
technology firms, meanwhile, have increased their lobbying of lawmakers
and regulators at the EU and member state levels.246
In sum, when the Regulation is adopted, it should state unambigu-
ously whether and to what extent search engines are subject to its require-
ments. It should include a requirement to notify website publishers and
authors of information when feasible. Moreover, it should impose trans-
parency requirements on controllers for the requests they receive instead
of leaving it up to industry to make such information public. Finally, the
EU should consider shifting the adjudicatory responsibility from search
engines to democratically accountable institutions.
244. See Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 12.
245. See DPA, supra note 242.
246. Ahmed & Robinson, supra note 226; Robert Lane Greene, Mr Schmidt Goes to
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the German Vice Chancellor and Economic Affairs Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, who had previ-
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